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Conflict in the Statutory Elicitation of
Aboriginal Culture in Australia
James F. Weiner
In order for Aboriginal rights and interests to be recognised under the Native Title Act
(1993), such rights and interests must arise from laws and customs that can be shown to
have continuity with the particular set of laws and customs that existed at the time of
sovereignty, or, at least, at the time of first European contact. This interpretation of
continuity has been applied in Australian native title cases since the High Court’s Yorta
Yorta decision (Yorta Yorta v the State of Victoria [2002] HCA 58). Yet today’s
Aboriginal native title claim groups are also required to participate in other statutory
ventures outside of the native title domain. For example, ‘tribal’ representatives in north
Queensland are obliged to represent their interests on the Wet Tropics Management
Authority, and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority. In native title terms,
however, the activity and time spent participating in these ventures do not ‘count’ as
instantiations of traditionally based rights and interests. Furthermore, the powers and
rights granted to Aboriginal groups under these statutory ventures are often in conflict
with the strictures of current native title interpretations of ‘traditional law and custom
and rights and interests’. The effect is to elicit versions of Aboriginal action that may
contradict each other legally. In this paper, I discuss some examples of these institutional
conflicts engendered by the statutory actions of state and federal government, and
comment on the implications for the contemporary Aboriginal articulations of identity
and tradition.
Keywords: Aboriginal; Native Title; Institutional Conflict
Introduction
Native title was introduced in Australia in 1992 with the High Court case of Mabo
(Mabo v Queensland No 2. [1992] HCA 23; ‘Mabo’). In this case, the High Court
recognised that Meriam people in the Torres Strait had been in possession of the
island of Mer before the acquisition of sovereignty over Australia by the British
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Crown in 1788. Furthermore, although the system by which the Meriam people
possessed and occupied their land was not a European system of property rights as
such, the High Court concluded that the common law recognised these rights, and
the Indigenous system of law and custom that underwrote them. The Mabo decision
put an end to the fiction of terra nullius as it was known in Australia: that the British
settlers arrived in a land ‘empty’ of people and hence ‘empty’ of law and property in
the European sense.
The High Court thus concluded that a concept of native title was recognised at
common law and, the next year, the Labor-led Parliament passed the Native Title
Act (1993). As part of the Act, Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) were set
up and funded by the Federal government to initiate applications by Indigenous
communities to the Federal Court for recognition of native title rights and
interests.
Over 1900 separate native title applications have since been lodged, however, of
those that have been determined through a Full Federal Court process (165), in only
62 cases has native title been found to exist in the entire claim area. Of the remaining
applications, many have been removed after Court administrative decisions, both
positive and negative, for example, where overlapping claims have been either merged
by agreement between the parties, or one or more parties have been ‘struck out’ after
their claim has been found to be without sufficient evidence to proceed. More than
450 applications remain to be resolved.1
Part of the explanation for the poor results in positive determinations of native
title applications since 1994 was that while native title was recognised at common
law, it was recognised only to the extent that it was said to co-exist with that common
law and the other laws of the Crown. In a number of key native title cases—for
example, the High Court’s Wik (Wik peoples v the State of Queensland [1996] HCA
40) decision that led to a comprehensive revision of native title by the Howard
government in 1998 (the so-called Wik amendments), and the High Court’s
Miriwung-Gajerrong decision (Ward v the State of Western Australia [2002] HCA
28)—the nature of this co-existence has been progressively clarified, usually by
acknowledging that other rights (such as those of pastoralists or the government) are
recognised separately from native title rights, which were previously more narrowly
defined. Other decisions have increasingly given more expansive powers to the
government to extinguish native title over certain tenures.
In many important respects, the fact of ‘co-existence’ established the legal
framework for a wide range of ‘official’ relationships between Aboriginal traditional
law and custom, and the law of the Australian state. Indigenous and settler
Australians have been co-existing practically (in the widest sense, socially,
geographically and historically), since the first arrival of Europeans. However, it
is only in recent times, with the passage of various state and federal statutes that
define and manage Australian Aboriginal cultural heritage, as well as Aboriginal
land rights legislation—the most significant of these being the Aboriginal Land






























the law has been confronted with the task of assessing and delimiting the nature of
Indigenous culture, and the rights and interests that can still be traced to it in the
present.
Australian Aboriginal culture, both as a mode of occupation of space and time and
as a ‘culture’ seen by us analogously as a set of rules and laws, is therefore not
autonomous. By the very fact of its recognition by the laws of the Australian state and
society, it is incorporated into that system of law. With recognition comes some
power and leverage within that society, but it comes at the expense of any sense of a
radical separation from, or autonomy within, the country of Australia. Many laws of
Australia pertain to land and its resources. All of these laws must now calibrate
themselves with regard to the existence of native title, and the inconsistencies
between the Native Title Act and pre-existing legislation have had to be continuously
clarified. In this article, I wish to address one such dimension of this inconsistency in
the contemporary period, in addition to contemplating the anthropological idea that
the inconsistency itself is what is conventional now in Australia.
Native Title as a ‘Social Fact’
I want to start by relaying a comment that anthropologist and native title consultant,
John Burton (pers. comm.), made to me, and this is a comment that every native title
anthropologist could make for themselves: ‘I went to make an appointment with
elder X to talk about his native title and he told me he couldn’t meet with me, he was
on a committee that was talking to the State about Indigenous management of
rainforests and had to attend a meeting’. In other words, his informant was saying to
him: ‘I have no time to pursue my native title, as I am busy exercising the rights over
land that the State has already granted me outside of the whole process’. It is these
rights outside of native title that I want to identify first.
Because as anthropologists we would wish to think of native title as encompassing
the entirety of traditional connection to land possessed by various Aboriginal land-
holding groups, we tend to look at all other rights to land that Aboriginal people
claim or strive to obtain as a variety of native title right in some important sense.
Some time ago, in my review (Weiner 2003) of David Martin and Christos
Mantziaris’ (2000) book Native Title Corporations, I spoke of native title as a ‘total
social fact’ or a ‘total institution’. I did not, and still do not, think that there is
anything anthropologically contentious about such a characterisation. If we are
charged with describing the relationship to a territory or a territorial life space of any
Aboriginal land-holding group, then by the terms of Aboriginal culture with which
we are familiar, this encompasses every aspect of their religious, economic and
political life. Our ethnographic understanding is that each Aboriginal group was itself
laid down within a specific place and with a specific language in a landscape during
the creative time, which henceforth becomes the mythological ‘charter’ for the
distinctive features of the group itself. For Australian Aboriginal people, the land
orients everything in human life and the religious institutions that manage human





























authority over and knowledge of land become central to the social, economic and
reproductive life of each group.
But as Martin and Mantziaris (2000) and many others have pointed out, such
regimes are now subsumed within an encompassing Euro-Australian nation state,
whose laws regulate the manner in which this total Indigenous landscape, in all its
distinct local manifestations, is recognised in the most comprehensive sense of the
term. As David Martin (pers. comm.) said to me, if, for Aboriginal Australians, the
Creator Beings made the world within which humans live, it is the courts of Australia
which now have the power to recognise and authenticate the power of these Creator
Beings, once again substituting a man-made world for the one bequeathed to
Aboriginal Australians, but not conceived as being ‘made’ by themselves at all.
From the point of view of this encompassing system, there are two features of its
legal underpinning that I wish to draw attention to here. First, it is not ‘global’ in the
sense that Le´vi-Strauss (1969) called societies that possessed elementary kinship
structures global in that it does not articulate itself as a totality; the laws that govern it
do not emerge from a single act of creation (what single act created the ‘common
law’?), but have emerged through time in a piecemeal ‘organic’ fashion.
Second, and following on from this observation, the law has the quality of parsing
the world, and human action within it, into discrete spheres. We not only have
distinct levels of jurisdiction among local government, state and federal laws and
courts, but we also have functionally-defined departmental structure to public, civic
and official life, which identify our distinct institutions: medical, labour, educational,
financial etc., and their attendant body of laws. This parsing is particularly visible in
the way property rights in land are defined, for, as I intimated earlier, property law in
Australia sees no piece of land as having a single encompassing right of ownership
over it—land is always held by more than one set of persons each of whom have
different kinds of rights in it (see Glaskin 2003, Sutton 2003, Rigsby 1998).2
Partial Rights
Let me tack now momentarily, to these various laws and bodies of law provide the
legal recognition of different institutions, functions, expertises and so forth that
contribute to Australian society and its common weal. As Martin and Mantziaris
(2000) point out, the recognition of any of these discrete spheres are only ever partial
in their contribution to the whole that is the Australian Commonwealth, despite the
claims they make to internal coherence within these separate disciplines. Although I
invoke Marilyn Strathern’s (1999) notion of ‘partiality’ here, this effect was noticed
many years previously by American anthropologist Robert Redfield (1960) when he
referred to Mexican peasant communities as being ‘part cultures’ as a result of their
necessary dependence upon external markets within a national economy.
Politically and culturally, we are in a period of history where, among other things,
multi-culturalism is the avowed policy of social inclusion. The notion of the






























‘stakeholder’ is but an updated version of the partible, multiple nature of rights in
land and the relation among rights-holders that has always founded common law
understandings of ownership of land. This broad movement towards social inclusion
encompasses the recognition of Indigenous rights to land based on their original
occupation of the continent. ‘Projects’ might have a wholeness and vision, but the
human personnel and interests that converge on and are elicited by them are
contingent and situational and have competing and inconsistent relations to land and
property.
I now turn to the case I wish to employ as an example in this analysis, that of the
Mamu native title claim to country around Innisfail, northern Queensland. Because of
the established link in public discourse between any land-related enterprise and
indigeneity, the state of Queensland has sought to include Indigenous people in
various enterprises. In north Queensland, the Wet Tropics Management Authority
(WETMA) has a board of Indigenous representatives, each one representing one of the
bama wabu or ‘rain forest people’ of that area. In one sense, this is a form of
Indigenous regionalism that rests on prior, pre-settlement relationships and
perceptions of inter-culturality (see Merlan 1998), and also reconfigures such
relationships in the interests of contemporary state goals. Similarly, the Great Barrier
Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) has invited each native title claim group from
the coastal areas associated with the Great Barrier Reef to participate in what they term
a ‘Traditional Use of Marine Resources Agreement’ (TUMRA). This too is a ‘region’
albeit one that has does not ‘reach back’ to any associations pre-sovereignty.3
In both cases, representatives of current native title claim groups have been granted
rights and authority over lands and waters that they so far have been unsuccessful in
obtaining as native title claimants. For example, the State of Queensland has
aggressively fought against the extension of native title to offshore areas; the Torres
Strait Islanders have only recently secured native title rights to sea areas (Torres Strait
Islanders v State of Queensland No. 2 [2010] FCA 643). For this reason, many coastal
groups, such as the Mamu of the Innisfail area, have excluded all offshore areas from
their claims. In Mamu, those of us assisting the claimants with their native title claim
have included in the claim area only those islands that the claimants can decisively
prove to have inhabited and used at the time of first contact (see Figure 1).
However, the TUMRA offered by the GBRMPA has granted these coastal groups
Indigenous authority over a segment of the Great Barrier Reef—even though they
never were able to go that far out to sea in pre-contact times [see Figure 2]—and the
right to take a certain number of marine resources, such as sea turtles and dugongs,
each year. Although such rights are not supported by the content on the current
Mamu native title application, the terms of the GBRMPA are that no agreement
made with Indigenous custodians shall be deemed to be affected by any decisions
made under the Native Title Act.
Section 211 of the Native Title Act allows Aboriginal people to continue engaging in
resource-taking activities for their own personal use, even when such of their native
title rights have been curtailed by laws pertaining to taking of resources, such as fishing





























Figure 1. Mamu Native Title Claim Area
Source: http://www.nntt.gov.au/Publications-And-Research/Maps-and-Spatial-Reports/
Pages/National-Maps.aspx (accessed 8/9/11).
































and game limits and prohibitions, or other permits or licensing. Following the High
Court decision in the Yanner case (Yanner v Eaton [1999] HCA 53; ‘Yanner’), there
have been other more local implementations in line with it, for example:
[I]f the exercise or enjoyment of native title rights and interests in relation to land
or waters consists of or includes carrying on hunting, fishing and gathering, and
some other law prohibits or restricts persons from carrying on that class of activity
other than in accordance with a licence, permit or other instrument granted or
issued under the law . . . in those circumstances the law does not prohibit or restrict
native title holders from carrying on the class of activity where they do so . . . for
the purpose of satisfying their personal, domestic or non-commercial communal
needs; and in exercise or enjoyment of their native title rights and interests. (Lewis v
Wanganeen and Harradine [2005] SASC 36, paras. 1–3, 35)
As part of the TUMRA agreement, Indigenous coastal native title applicants in
Queensland who are included in the GBRMPA area must display a license on their
boats, and must complete a form and submit it to GBRMPA each time they take a sea
animal. This is part of the state’s ongoing management of marine resources in the
Great Barrier Reef and their strict control of its faunal environment.
I commented to the lawyers at North Queensland Land Council that at least in this
case, native title applicants will henceforth be obliged to record each event of their
traditional use of country and resources, which will undoubtedly prove to be an asset
for the future protection of native title rights and interests. I will not dwell here on
the way in which Indigenous use of country is regulated and policed by these
mechanisms, because I think this distorts a moment of state self-constitution that is
somewhat more subtle than that. Rather, I see this as a broader governmental policy
that is non-partisan in nature and which can be summed up as the requirement to
elicit Indigenous consent and ensure the continuing visibility of Aboriginal traditionality
in certain kinds of initiatives having to do with resource use, land and environmental
management.4 It is part of the way in which the 21st century Australian polity is
choosing to repatriate the Indigenous component of its national identity, and this
moment of social and political consciousness goes far beyond native title in many
important respects. What I am saying is that it is necessary for the consolidation of
the Great Barrier Reef management vision for there to be visible Indigenous
participation, of a traditional-looking nature.
As I said, a proviso in the agreement the Mamu signed with the GBRMPA
stipulates that nothing in the agreement will be construed as having an effect on
native title. In short, the rights offered to the Mamu and other coastal native title
claim groups through their TUMRA are not native title rights, but nor do they
undermine anything in the native title claim these groups have lodged.
Statutory Inconsistency
Native title groups all over the country are entering into such agreements in which
they gain rights and authority over activities on their traditional land that they could





























never look forward to winning in a native title claim. In Victoria, for example, native
title is a very recent formulation of Indigenous rights to country, and it has not
displaced the older relations of regional Indigenous cultural heritage management
that have existed under the aegis of the state government body known as Aboriginal
Affairs Victoria. The map that shows the regional areas bears very little relationship to
the cultural map of named groups engendered by the native title application process.
In the Northern Territory, more than half of the land has been transferred to
Aboriginal freehold title under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (1976), which has
resulted in many agreements between Aboriginal traditional owners and resource
companies or national and state parks. The State of Queensland’s Aboriginal Land Act
(1983) has similarly granted rights in various state parks to Aboriginal traditional
owners well before the Native Title Act (1993) was passed.5
From the point of view of social analysis, native title might well be a ‘total social
institution’ as I have previously termed it. However, it has also proven to be far from
the most empowering of the institutions of social inclusion that have allowed
Indigenous people to have the semblance of a public presence in various land-based
decision-making and stakeholder forums. Native title now plays its role as but one of
the milestones along the pathway that Indigenous groups travel to achieve
recognition in the broadest sense of the term. I do not see this as a specifically
Australian issue either because almost exactly the same thing occurs in Papua New
Guinea and elsewhere in other former settler states, like the US and Canada.
Indigenous traditional owners thus have different and inconsistent relations to
their land depending on which law, statutory body or private concern they happen to
be dealing with. The different relations are governed largely by what kind of tenure
the government determined their traditional land happened to fall under in the post-
sovereignty period.6 In a non-native title agreement, Indigenous people are often
offered rights that they never enjoyed before contact; in native title negotiations
themselves, the most basic rights that they patently and demonstrably possessed
before contact are commonly severely curtailed. What might Indigenous owners
themselves be making of this inconsistency?
One of the problems that this might be creating is inconsistency in the way the law
assesses the issue of continuity of traditional laws and customs that is required now in
native title applications. If different private, government and statutory agencies are
recognising Aboriginal identities and law and custom that are both contemporary
and cannot be traced back to laws, customs or practices that existed at the time of
sovereignty, they may be bequeathing difficulties to the next generation of native title
holders. It seems that from an anthropological perspective, Indigenous communities
are creating the conditions for internal inconsistencies that will have implications for
the way their culture and legal rights are interpreted in the future. There are some
political dimensions to these perceived effects of partiality on the articulation of
Indigenous culture that we can then consider.
For is this not the dilemma that we all live under these days? If I were Papua New






























road, the business road, the cultural heritage road, the road of kastom (i.e., traditional
customary law) and the native title road, and that each one offers its own advantages
and disadvantages (Filer 2006). However, none of them is the road, and none of them
are to be spurned if there is a real advantage at the end of it. Whether all the roads
add up to a single coherent set of pathways for any single Papua New Guinea village
or villager is not the issue, because articulating a whole vision of society and its future
is not necessarily one of the roads that you can get on there. In Papua New Guinea
and in the parts of Aboriginal Australia I have worked in over the past twelve years,
articulating the ‘whole’ was a very intermittent activity, hedged with restrictions and
dangers, and only ultimately accessible by a select few with proven powers.
If I were an American of leftish-centrist persuasions, I might say that what the 1998
Wik amendments have done to native title, aided by over a decade since of harshly
literalist and conservative judgements in the Federal and High Courts of Australia
(with one or two exceptions), is to ensure that Indigenous traditional owners get
more benefits outside of the determination ‘road’ than they do staying on that road.
Native title, in 2011, does no more than buy Indigenous claimants a ticket to the
bigger world of negotiation where we all live (cf. Ritter 2009). After that, it is up to
them to be as resolute, clever and effective as they can be to leverage what they can
from the other stakeholders. If I were such an American, I might think this was not a
bad thing, as it encouraged self-reliance and individual commitment and discouraged
being dependent upon the capricious mercy of business, politicians, bureaucrats and
the Australian voters.
Conclusions: Inconsistency and Inter-Culturality
I started out in this article lamenting the ‘parsing’ of Aboriginal society that our laws
and vision of the social organism foist upon them. We can continue disparaging the
naı¨ve social science of judges and lawyers, we can continue defending the ‘holistic’
nature of Aboriginal society, and by that token, its insulation from all of the
mechanisms of parsing that the modern world exerts on the rest of us. We can keep
attributing radical alterity to Indigenous Australians knowing that such a
categorisation precludes Australian society from any meaningful understanding of
their culture, and social life. But the legal inconsistency I am talking about here, and
its implications for the way cultural difference is articulated, is not synonymous with
radical alterity. Its resolution, by the same token, has to by-pass the dead-end of such
radical alterity.
We might be tempted, as I think some sub-Cape York Queensland NTRBs have
been, unofficially or otherwise, to think that getting claimant groups ready to sign
agreements is about the best success they can hope to achieve on behalf of their
clients, and that struggling endlessly, and so far fruitlessly, for a consent
determination is not going to materially add anything to the terms of these
agreements—in fact, such struggles only threaten to imperil and curtail the rights and
interests that they have garnered for themselves in many of those agreements.





























However, what I am really circling around is the difference between two kinds of
recognition: the recognition of the traditionality of Indigenous Australians, and their
status as traditional owners full stop, and the granting of substantive rights and
property to them, rights and property they will henceforth be obliged to manage and
protect. It is always a struggle to balance native title and Indigenous heritage with
these two often competing and inconsistent goals. It is not clear to me after twelve
years of writing, defending and refereeing anthropological reports associated with
native title applications that many native title claim groups are altogether clear on
how to manage both in relation to each other. However, recognising the partiality of
our cultural portraits of traditionality is another way of recognising the engagement
between such parts; and this is what I mean by the utter conventionality of
inconsistency.
Notes
[1] http://www.nntt.gov.au/Applications-And-Determinations/Search-Applications (accessed 19
July 2011).
[2] Of course in regional systems, such as the one I have been working in recently in the Pilbara, a
set of linked language groups have rights and responsibilities for segments of a single dreaming
track relating to primary Creator Beings. Separately, their rights and responsibilities are partial
in relationship to the whole, that is, the dreaming/creation story. Collectively, the regional
system manages a far more ‘complete’ segment of that dreaming track. Local Aboriginal
systems are therefore not, strictly-speaking, ‘global’ in every sense that Le´vi-Strauss meant.
[3] Indigenous rights to ‘sea country’ were first recognised in the Croker Island native title
application (Yarmirr v Northern Territory [1998] FCA 1185) off the coast of the Northern
Territory, which ultimately went to the High Court (Yarmirr v Northern Territory [2001] HCA
56). However, the extent of the sea boundary was much narrower than that encompassed by
the Great Barrier Reef.
[4] This is an example of what Tim Rowse (2002, 179) calls ‘organised instances of mobilisation’ of
Indigenous people.
[5] See Altman and Martin (2009) for other examples of benefits that Indigenous communities
receive outside of native title, particularly in relation to resource agreements.
[6] Different tenure is largely related to the pattern of European settlement. Generally those areas
settled first and more densely, such as in southeast Australia, were handed over to Europeans as
freehold title, while in those areas settled later, particularly in northern Australia, the
Europeans tended to secure a weaker form of title such as a pastoral lease.
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